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Colloquium Series

We highlight exemplary work at this interface through a monthly online colloquium series. You can find below a list of the past and upcoming talks as well as details for attending the talks. Recordings of past talks can also be found on our youtube channel.

Spring 2019 Talks

Justine Hastings, Brown University

Date: Friday, May 10, 1:00-2:15 PM EST

Link: Forthcoming


Justine Hastings is a Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs at Brown University and a Faculty Research Associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research. Her areas of expertise include research in Industrial Organization and Public Economics which address important economic and public policy questions. She has conducted academic research on topics such as market structure and competition, environment and energy regulation, advertising and consumer protection, consumer financial markets, health care, social safety-net programs, and markets for higher education. Her research employs diverse empirical techniques including field experiments, survey analysis, machine learning, predictive analytics, analysis of large administrative datasets, and structural demand and supply estimation. Her research was cited in the 2017 Nobel Prize scientific background materials, and has been used to shape public policy improvements around the world. Professor Hastings is the founding director of Research Improving People’s Lives (RIPL), a nonprofit research institute using data and science to impact policy and improve lives.



Previous Colloquium Talks

Rajiv Sethi, Barnard College, Columbia University

Date: Friday, April 5, 1:00-2:30 PM EST

Link: Youtube Live


Rajiv Sethi is a Professor of Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University and an External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. He has previously held visiting positions at Microsoft Research in New York City, and at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review and Economics and Philosophy. His current research deals with information and beliefs, including examining how stereotypes affect interactions among strangers, especially in relation to crime and the criminal justice system. He is also part of a large interdisciplinary team working on the forecasting of geopolitical events using methods that combine machine models with human judgment. Rajiv is a founding member of CORE (Curriculum Open-Access Resources for Economics), a group of scholars engaged in the production of high-quality freely-available resources for the teaching of economics.


The Geography of Lethal Force

Police officers in the United States currently kill about eleven hundred civilians annually. In contrast, police in Germany kill fewer than ten a year, and those in England and Wales kill about two. This talk will examine recent data on police homicides in the US, with particular attention to the geographic distribution of incidents and racial disparities in victimization. I consider and evaluate two competing hypotheses that seek to account for the data, and discuss the possibility that Simpson’s paradox may be relevant for understanding the patterns that we see. Some historical context is provided with reference to the 1968 Kerner Commission Report and the Carnegie-Myrdal study of the 1930s. The talk will draw on material from Shadows of Doubt: Stereotypes, Crime and the Pursuit of Justice, written jointly with Brendan O’Flaherty (Harvard University Press, forthcoming in April 2019) as well as ongoing work with Jose Luis Monteil Olea and Brendan O'Flaherty.

Matthew Jackson, Stanford University

Date: Friday, March 1, 1:00-2:30 PM EST

Link: Youtube Live


Matthew O. Jackson is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University and an external faculty member of the Santa Fe Institute and a senior fellow of CIFAR. He was at Northwestern University and Caltech before joining Stanford, and received his BA from Princeton University in 1984 and PhD from Stanford in 1988. Jackson's research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory, and the study of social and economic networks, on which he has published many articles and the books `The Human Network' and `Social and Economic Networks'. He also teaches an online course on networks and co-teaches two others on game theory. Jackson is a Member of the National Academy of Sciences, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a Game Theory Society Fellow, and an Economic Theory Fellow, and his other honors include the von Neumann Award, a Guggenheim Fellowship, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, the B.E.Press Arrow Prize for Senior Economists, and teaching awards. He has served as co-editor of Games and Economic Behavior, the Review of Economic Design, and Econometrica.


Using Gossips to Spread Information: Theory and Evidence from Two Randomized Controlled Trials

Can we identify highly central individuals in a network without collecting network data, simply by asking community members? Can seeding information via such nominated individuals lead to significantly wider diffusion than {choosing} randomly chosen people, or even respected ones? In two separate large field experiments in India, we answer both questions in the affirmative. In particular, in 521 villages in Haryana, we provided information on monthly immunization camps to either randomly selected individuals (in some villages) or to individuals nominated by villagers as people who would be good at transmitting information (in other villages). We find that the number of children vaccinated every month is 22% higher in villages in which nominees received the information. We show that people's knowledge of who are highly central individuals and good seeds can be explained by a model in which community members simply track how often they hear gossip about others. Indeed, we find in a third dataset that nominated seeds are central in a network sense, {and are} not just those with many friends or in {powerful} positions.

Tawanna Dillahunt, University of Michigan

Date: Friday, January 25th, 1:00-2:30 PM EST


Tawanna Dillahunt is an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan’s School of Information and holds a courtesy appointment with the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department. Tawanna earned her Ph.D. in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) from Carnegie Mellon University. She now leads the Social Innovations research group, an interdisciplinary group of individuals whose vision is to design, build, and enhance technologies to solve real-world problems affecting marginalized groups and individuals primarily in the U.S. Our current projects aim to address unemployment, environmental sustainability, and technical literacy by fostering social and sociotechnical capital within these communities.


Designing and Envisioning Digital Tools for Low-resource Job Seekers

Today’s Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are designed to address one of society’s most pressing problems---unemployment. These technologies support job seekers’ ability to search for jobs, create resumes, highlight skills, share employment opportunities, and even transport to work and job counseling. However, the benefits of employment tools and technologies are unequally distributed and provide limited advantages for certain populations in our society. Like other valuable resources, ICTs have done little to support individuals with limited knowledge, skills, or experience to leverage them and who often face geographic and social isolation. Without an understanding of how people from low-resource settings use ICTs for job seeking, the same employment inequalities that occur offline will be repeated in online contexts. In this presentation, I will discuss the results of several studies that investigate how ICTs could improve employability, particularly among job seekers with limited digital skills, education, and income, and those who are geographically and socially isolated. I will also discuss new principles for fostering innovations among these populations and identify barriers for designers and technologists to address in the future.


Alvin Roth, Stanford University

Date: Thursday, December 13th, 12:00-1:30 PM EST
Link: Youtube Live


Al Roth is a professor of Economics at Stanford. He shared the 2012 Nobel prize in Economics for “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design”.


Market design is more complicated than mechanism design. And so is achieving good social outcomes.

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and so potential marketplace participants may have large strategy sets, that include actions taken outside of the marketplace. And markets require social support, so the behavior of people who do not intend to participate in the market may nevertheless be important for market design. This talk will illustrate these points with some examples, drawing on experience from the design of school choice systems and kidney exchange clearinghouses.


Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago

Date: Monday, November 12th, 1:00-2:30 PM EST
Link: Youtube Live


Canice Prendergast is the author of "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency" published in the Journal of Political Economy in 2003 and "The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives" that appeared in the Journal of Political Economy in 2002. Prendergast is widely published, with work appearing in the Economic Journal, the Journal of Labor Economics, the American Economic Review, the Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, and the European Economic Review. Articles on his recent research have appeared in Fortune Magazine, the Financial Times, the Economist, and Der Spiegel.


The Allocation of Food to Food Banks

Feeding America distributes food to food banks across the United States. In 2005, it transitioned from a centralized allocation process to one where local affiliates would bid for food items through an online auction mechanism. To do so, it constructed a specialized currency called “shares”. The change, its necessary idiosyncrasies, and outcomes are described here. We both show that the new system exhibits desirable theoretical properties, and document considerable welfare implications. The choices of the food banks vary enormously from the allocations they received under the old system, and much of this gain is from sorting of food banks along the quality-quantity dimension. Furthermore, supply of food rose by roughly 100 million pounds around the time of its introduction. A structural exercise estimates that the value of reallocated demand effectively meant that each pound of food allocated through this system increased efficiency by almost another additional pound.